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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Randy C. Eiland appeals from his judgment of conviction for battery with 
intent to commit robbery and burglary. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 On the morning of October 21, 2014, Muzna Saied and her daughter Mala 
Saied answered a knock on the front door of their Sandpoint home.  (9/14/15 Tr., 
p. 15, L. 14 – p. 17, L. 24; p. 76, L. 9 – p. 77, L. 18.)  In doing so, Mala turned off 
the security system.  (9/14/15 Tr., p. 19, L. 23 - p. 20, L. 6; p. 77, Ls. 19-22.)  
There was, however, no one there.  (9/14/15 Tr., p. 17, L. 24 – p. 18, L. 5; p. 77, 
Ls. 22-24.)  Shortly thereafter an intruder broke in through a glass door at the 
back of the house and Muzna screamed for her husband, Raffat Saied.   (9/14/15 
Tr., p. 20, L. 7 – p. 21, L. 22; p. 55, L. 24 – p. 56, L. 24; p. 77, L. 25 – p. 78, L. 9.)  
Raffat met the intruder on a staircase to the bedrooms upstairs, and the intruder 
sprayed him with pepper or bear spray.  (9/14/15 Tr., p. 21, L. 19 - p. 22, L. 11; p. 
30, L. 3 – p. 31, L. 1; p. 57, Ls. 6-20; p. 78, Ls. 10-19.)  The family retreated into 
the master bedroom.  (9/14/15 Tr., p. 21, L. 25 – p. 22, L. 15; p. 58, Ls. 10-12; p. 
78, Ls. 20-22.)  There ensued a struggle at the door, with the intruder trying to 
force his way in and the Saied family trying to hold him out, with the intruder 
spraying the pepper or bear spray into the bedroom.  (9/14/15 Tr., p. 21, L. 25 – 
p. 24, L. 2; p. 58, Ls. 12-25; p. 78, L. 22 – p. 79, L. 20.)  The struggle ended 




19 – p. 24, L. 4; p. 37, L. 20 – p. 38, L. 12; p. 59, L. 1 – p. 60, L. 14; p. 83, Ls. 8-
19.) 
 In the 911 call Raffat Saied described the intruder as about 6 feet tall and 
wearing a red jacket.  (9/14/15 Tr., p. 89, Ls. 1-4; Trial Tr., p. 32, Ls. 8-16; 
Defense Exhibit B.)  Responding officers found a broken glass door in the back 
of the house.  (9/14/15 Tr., p. 91, Ls. 19-22; p. 101, L. 7 – p. 103, L. 4; State’s 
Exhibits 4, 23-25.)  They also found a can of bear spray by the front door.  
(9/14/15 Tr., p. 94, L. 22 – p. 95, L. 13; Trial Tr., p. 76, L. 24 – p. 77, L. 16; 
State’s Exhibit 12.)  The Saieds described the intruder to responding officers as 
slightly taller than the 6’0” officer and wearing a red and black or red and gray 
jacket.  (Trial Tr., p. 26, L. 19 – p. 32, L. 16; Defense Exhibit A.)   
 Shortly after the break-in former police officer and current Department of 
Labor employee Tyler Anderson was walking in the neighborhood near his office 
when an officer drove by and informed him they were looking for a man wearing 
black and red who might be suffering the effects of pepper spray.  (Trial Tr., p. 
43, L. 15 – p. 47, L. 23.)  Soon after returning from the walk Anderson saw a man 
meeting the officer’s description, including that he was suffering from the effects 
of pepper spray, walk into the office and head straight to the bathroom.  (Trial Tr., 
p. 47, L. 24 – p. 48, L. 21.)  Anderson informed his supervisor and called 911.  
(Trial Tr., p. 48, Ls. 21-25.)  After officers seized Eiland just outside the office, 
Anderson identified him as the man he had seen.  (Trial Tr., p. 49, L. 23 – p. 51, 




 The arresting officer testified that she could smell pepper spray on 
Eiland’s person and that his eyes were red.  (Trial Tr., p. 79, Ls. 4-13; see also p. 
109, L. 2 – p. 113, L. 2; p. 192, L. 20 – p. 193, L. 5; p. 380, Ls. 7-14.)  After 
arresting Eiland officers discovered an envelope and two tins of chewing tobacco 
in his pocket, one opened and one still sealed.  (Trial Tr., p. 78, L. 15 – p. 80, L. 
7; p. 192, Ls. 9-19; State’s Exhibit 36.)  The envelope “had the overwhelming 
odor of pepper spray on it” and several stains with a color consistent with the 
staining left on the Saieds’ bedroom door by the pepper spray used by their 
assailant.  (Trial Tr., p.  80, L. 20 – p. 81, L. 2; p. 193, Ls. 5-10; State’s Exhibits 
36, 37; compare with State’s Exhibits 14, 17, 19.)  Police also found on his 
person a pair of gloves that also smelled strongly of pepper spray.  (Trial Tr., p. 
115, L. 24 – p. 116, L. 2; p. 122, L. 16 – p. 131, L. 2; p. 190, L. 11 – p. 192, L. 8; 
State’s Exhibit 38 (court photo of physical evidence).) 
 Further investigation by police revealed that about two hours before the 
home-invasion Eiland purchased bear spray of the same sort used in the attack, 
24-inch zip ties, and a tin of chewing tobacco matching one of the tins found on 
his person.  (Trial Tr., p. 140, L. 7 – p. 154, L. 19; p. 158, L. 21 – p. 159, L. 18; p. 
206, L. 14 – p. 214, L. 25; p. 220, L. 15 – p. 232, L.10; State’s Exhibits 39, 40.)  
Glass shards from the Saieds’ back door were also found in Eiland’s clothing.  
(Trial Tr., p. 181, L. 22 – p. 190, L. 8; p. 193, L. 11 – p. 205, L. 10; p. 287, L. 9 – 
p. 308, L.14; State’s Exhibits 25, 42-49.) 
 The state charged Eiland with battery with intent to commit a serious 




with a persistent violator enhancement based on prior convictions for murder, 
burglary and theft.  (R., vol. I, pp. 97-98, 114-16; vol. III, 443-45.)  The district 
court scheduled the trial for April 13, 2015, a little more than five months after the 
filing of the information.  (R., vol. I, pp. 107-10.)   
 Eiland filed a motion to dismiss his appointed counsel and to represent 
himself (with standby counsel).  (R., vol. I, pp. 131-33.)  The trial court granted 
that motion.  (3/6/15 Tr., p. 20, L. 25 – p. 21, L. 2.)  Thereafter Eiland requested 
funds for investigative services.  (R., vol. I, p. 148.)  The court granted the 
motion, authorizing 40 billable hours of investigative services.  (R., vol. I, p. 157; 
3/20/15 Tr., p. 9, L. 20 – p. 10, L. 6.)  On Eiland’s request for more time to 
prepare, the district court continued the trial until July 13, 2015.  (3/20/15 Tr., p. 
10, L. 11 – p. 12, L. 4.)  About a month later, on April 28, 2015, the court moved 
the trial date to June 8, 2015.  (R., vol. I, p. 187.)   
 After the first continuance Eiland filed motions for funds to hire forensic 
expert William Schneck (R., vol. I, p. 165) and to pay for phone services (R., vol. 
I, pp. 172-73). The court granted the motions.  (R., vol. I, pp. 195-96; vol. II, pp. 
242-43; 5/5/15 Tr., p. 22, L. 1 – p. 29, L. 11.)  The court ordered $50 for phone 
use for trial preparation.  (R., vol. II, p. 243.)  The court also ordered a 
“reasonable amount of funds” to hire Schneck if he was both “available to testify” 
at trial and “willing and able to perform forensic services for the defense.”  (R., 
vol. I, p. 196.) 
 Eiland filed a second request to continue the trial.  (R., vol. II, pp. 259-60.)  




5/22/15 Tr., p. 4, L. 9 – p. 5, L. 13.)  The trial judge granted the motion, and 
continued the trial for two months, until August 10, 2015.  (R., vol. II, p. 270; 
5/22/15 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 18-22.)   
 On June 8, 2015, Eiland moved for funding to have his investigator 
present when the police sent requested physical samples to his expert, Schneck, 
and to hire Daniel Reisberg as an expert in “cross-contamination” of witnesses.  
(R., vol. II, pp. 284-85; 6/15/15 Tr., p. 20, L. 9 – p. 21, L. 11.)  The district court 
granted both requests on June 16, 2015, the payment for Dr. Reisberg 
contingent on him being “available” to testify at trial and “willing and able to testify 
for the defense.”  (R., vol. II, pp. 302-04.) 
 Eiland filed his third request for a continuance on July 6, 2015.  (R., vol. II, 
pp. 309-12.)  The district court granted a continuance of one month, to 
September 14, 2015.  (R., vol. II, pp. 322-23, 325.)  The court, in its order, 
provided notice that “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances the court will not 
entertain any further motions by Mr. Eiland to continue this trial.”  (R., vol. II, p. 
323.)  
 Seventeen days after the court granted his third continuance, Eiland 
moved for funds “for the services of Bill Schneck, Forensics Investigation, 
Geoffrey Loftus, Ph.D., Psychologist, and Global CompuSearch, Forensic 
Investigation,” claiming such were “necessary to prepare an effective defense.”  
(R., vol. II, p. 351.)  Eiland filed his fourth motion for continuance of the trial on 
August 10, 2015.  (R., vol. II, p. 359.)  He noticed up both motions for hearing on 




p. 351, 359.)  The basis for the continuance motion was a general lack of 
preparation for trial.  (9/11/15 Tr., p. 2, L. 14 – p. 4, L. 2; p. 5, L. 24 – p. 6, L. 24.)  
At the hearing standby counsel represented, regarding the defense experts, that 
Mr. Schneck had sent a report to Eiland, but Dr. Reisberg “won’t do anything until 
he talks to Mr. Eiland in person,” which he was unable to do because Eiland 
“doesn’t have any money on his books to talk to Mr. Reisberg.”  (9/11/15 Tr., p. 3, 
Ls. 13-22; see also Id. at p. 8, L. 15 – p. 9, L. 17; p. 11, L. 7 – p. 14, L. 14.)  The 
district court denied the motion to continue.  (R., vol. III, pp. 493-95; 9/11/15 Tr., 
p. 5, Ls. 11-23.)  Because the court denied the continuance, it also denied the 
motion for funding to hire new or additional experts.  (R., vol. III, pp. 493-95; 
9/11/15 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 10-22.)   
 Finally, Mr. Eiland made a motion to disqualify himself from acting as his 
own counsel because he was not prepared for trial.  (R., vol. IV, p. 676.)  The 
court took up the motion just before the trial commenced and treated it as 
another request for a continuance.  (9/14/15 Tr., p. 5, L. 3 – p. 10, L. 17.)  The 
district court denied it, in part, because the constant requests for continuances 
had “just been a tactic that you don’t want to go to trial, and we need to get this 
case to trial.”   (9/14/15 Tr., p. 13, L. 5 – p. 14, L. 11.) 
 The case proceeded to trial.  (R., vol. IV, pp. 688-707, 744-91, 794-99.)  
The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts.  (R., vol. IV, pp. 800-801.)  The 
court found Eiland to be a persistent violator after a court trial.  (Trial Tr., p. 477, 




years determinate.  (R., vol. IV, pp. 850-52.)  Eiland filed a timely notice of 






  Eiland states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Eiland’s 
last motion for a continuance because the denial prejudiced his due 
process right to a fair trial? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 11.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
Has Eiland failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it denied 










Eiland Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It 




 As shown above, Eiland requested five continuances, all based on claims 
that he needed more time to prepare for trial.  The first three continuances were 
granted, giving the defense a total of more than ten months to prepare for trial.  
On appeal Eiland has narrowed his claim to the denial of his fourth motion for a 
continuance, and further narrowed the claim related to that continuance from a 
general need for additional time to prepare for trial to an alleged denial of the 
opportunity to present the testimony of Dr. Reisberg at trial.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 
12.)  Application of the law to the relevant facts, however, shows no abuse of 
discretion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“[T]he granting of a motion for continuance is vested in the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and the action of that court will not be disturbed 
unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.”  State v. Richardson, 95 
Idaho 446, 448, 511 P.2d 263, 265 (1973) (citations omitted); accord State v. 
Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729, 736, 240 P.3d 575, 582 (2010); State v. Miller, 133 
Idaho 454, 457, 988 P.2d 680, 683 (1999); Hall v. State, 156 Idaho 125, 131, 320 






C. The Record Shows The District Court Specifically Provided The 
Resources For Eiland To Utilize The Services Of Dr. Reisberg As An 
Expert 
 
 “Unless an appellant shows that his or her substantial rights have been 
prejudiced by reason of a denial of a motion for continuance, appellate courts 
can only conclude that there was no abuse of discretion.”  State v. Averett, 142 
Idaho 879, 889, 136 P.3d 350, 360 (Ct. App. 2006).  The substantial right 
identified by Eiland is the right of “‘access to the raw materials integral to the 
building of an effective defense,’” specifically the right to retain Dr. Reisberg as 
an expert witness.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-19 (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 
U.S. 68, 77 (1985).)  The record, however, shows that the district court did not 
deny Eiland the opportunity to retain Dr. Reisberg at public expense.  Rather, the 
district court specifically authorized the funds for Eiland to retain Dr. Reisberg.  
(R., vol. II, pp. 302-04.)  Moreover, the district court did so with ample time and 
opportunity for Eiland to secure Dr. Reisberg as an expert witness prior to trial.  
(Id.)  That Eiland simply failed to take adequate action on the district court’s grant 
of resources cannot be attributed to the district court. 
 Eiland argues that “by authorizing the funds to allow Mr. Eiland to hire Dr. 
Reisberg,” the court “essentially ruled Dr. Reisberg’s expert assistance on co-
witness contamination was necessary for a fair trial and a meaningful opportunity 
to prepare a defense.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.)  “After essentially ruling Dr. 
Reisberg’s expert assistance was necessary for a fair trial and a meaningful 
opportunity to prepare a defense, the district court prejudiced Mr. Eiland’s right to 




This argument, that a court must always grant multiple continuances when a 
defendant fails to secure the attendance of an expert witness, fails for several 
reasons. 
 First, it fails on its initial premise.  Although it is true that “denial of access 
to the basic tools of an adequate defense impinges on the defendant’s due 
process right to a fair trial,” State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 419, 348 P.3d 1, 34 
(2015), it is not true that all decisions authorizing expenditure of public funds on 
an indigent defendant’s behalf are findings that the expert at issue must 
ultimately be called at trial.  Indeed, it is easy to imagine scenarios where 
consultation with an expert renders that expert not only unnecessary to the 
defense, but actually harmful.  The order in this case granting funds for Eiland to 
retain Dr. Reisberg did not “essentially” rule Dr. Reisberg’s testimony necessary 
for a fair trial. 
 It is not surprising that Eiland would rather talk about an alleged implied 
ruling made several weeks before his motion for a fourth extension, because his 
actual demonstration in association with the motion does not show what Dr. 
Reisberg would have testified to, much less that such testimony was necessary 
for a fair trial.1  In conjunction with his motion Eiland represented that he had 
talked to Dr. Reisberg once and his standby counsel had sent Dr. Reisberg 
emails.  (9/11/15 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 6-21.)  However, standby counsel also 
acknowledged that Dr. Reisberg had not done “anything” in relation to the case.  
                                            
1 Eiland also tries to transfer his burden of proving prejudice in the denial of his 
motion for a fourth continuance by asserting that the state must demonstrate 




(9/11/15 Tr., p. 3, Ls. 19-22.)  In short, Eiland is depending on this Court 
assuming that Dr. Reisberg’s review of case materials would have produced 
favorable opinion testimony. 
 Moreover, even if Dr. Reisberg could have presented favorable opinion 
testimony challenging the reliability of the Saieds’ identification, such would not 
have prejudiced Eiland’s substantial rights because of the overwhelming 
identification evidence.  As set forth above in the statement of the case, the 
evidence established that Eiland, about two hours before the attack, purchased 
the bear spray used in the attack, 24-inch zip ties, and a can of chewing tobacco 
later found on his person.  He was seen within an hour after the attack suffering 
the effects of pepper spray exposure; he also smelled of pepper spray and had 
glass from the shattered back door in and on his pants and jacket.  Even if 
interviewing the Saieds together immediately after the attack and showing two of 
them a one-person show-up made their identifications less reliable to some 
degree, such would not reduce the overwhelming circumstantial evidence that 
Eiland was in fact their attacker. 
 Second, ordering availability of funds to retain an expert does not remove 
discretion by the district court.  The court may also properly consider prejudice to 
the state, see, e.g., State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478, 481, 927 P.2d 451, 454 (Ct. 
App. 1996) (denial of motion for continuance to secure attendance of witness 
with potentially relevant testimony not abuse of discretion when compared to 
prejudice to state), and diligence of the defense, see, e.g., State v. Dopp, 129 




absence of showing of inability to secure evidence, did not abuse discretion in 
denying motion to continue sentencing).  The record shows that any failure to 
secure Dr. Reisberg’s testimony for trial was Eiland’s, not the court’s, and 
therefore any prejudice arose not from the court’s actions but from the 
defendant’s inaction.  
In this case the district court granted Eiland three continuances, totaling 
five months, to prepare for trial.  (R., vol. I, pp. 107 (trial originally set for 
4/13/15), 187 (first extension to 6/8/15); vol. II, pp. 270 (second extension to 
8/10/15), 325 (third extension to 9/14/15).)  The trial was held more than ten 
months after the filing of the information.  (R., vol. I, p. 97 (information filed 
11/5/14); vol. IV, p. 688 (start of trial on 9/14/15).)  The district court authorized 
the funds to retain Dr. Reisberg about three months before the trial, and only a 
few days after the funding was requested.  (R., vol. II, pp. 284-85 (request for 
funds to retain Dr. Reisberg filed 6/8/15), 302-04 (order authorizing funds on 
6/16/15); vol. IV, p. 688 (start of trial on 9/14/15).)  The district court granted 
Eiland’s third continuance after the order granting funds for Dr. Reisberg was 
entered.  (R., vol. II, pp. 302, 322.)  Ultimately the defense had 90 days to retain 
Dr. Reisberg and secure his testimony.  (R., vol. II, p. 302 (order approving hiring 
Dr. Reisberg at public expense entered 6/16/15); vol. IV, p. 688 (trial started 
9/14/15).)    
 The evidence does not show that 90 days was insufficient time to retain 
Dr. Reisberg and secure his testimony for trial.  Eiland filed his motion for a fourth 




11, 2015.  (R., vol. II, p. 359.)  At the September 11, 2015 hearing the defense 
represented that more time was necessary to retain Dr. Reisberg.  The defense 
represented that, in the three months since the court had authorized payment to 
retain Dr. Reisberg, Eiland had, at some unknown time, spoken to him “one time” 
and his conflict counsel had, also at some unknown time, “sent him emails” to 
which Dr. Reisberg had replied that he would not “do anything until he talks to 
Mr. Eiland.”  (9/11/15 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 6-21.)   However, that talk had not happened 
“because he doesn’t have any money on his books to talk to Mr. Reisberg.”  
(9/11/15 Tr., p. 3, Ls. 19-22.)  Any claim that lack of funds prevented the timely 
retention of Dr. Reisberg does not withstand scrutiny, however.   
 Initially, the trial court had specifically authorized the funds to retain Dr. 
Reisberg almost three months before the September 11 hearing.  (R., vol. II, pp. 
302-04 (authorizing funds on 6/8/15).)  The order is in the same form as that 
authorizing funding to retain William Schneck (R., vol. I, pp. 195-96), who 
testified at trial (Trial Tr., p. 386, L.s 16-19).  The lack of “money on his books” 
was not for lack of the trial court authorizing funds for the defense to retain Dr. 
Reisberg.   
 In context, it appears that Eiland was claiming that he had not retained or 
adequately prepared to have Dr. Reisberg testify at trial because he ran out of 
funds for telephone communication.  (9/11/15 Tr., p. 2, L. 16 – p. 3, L. 22.)  The 
district court authorized $50 for long-distance telephone communication with out-
of-state experts on May 8, 2015.  (R., vol. II, pp. 242-43.)  At the September 11, 




of funds, apparently on August 15.  (9/11/15 Tr., p. 2, Ls. 22-23.)  However, 
Eiland’s August 7, 2015 motion for new funds makes no mention of needing 
additional money for telephone calls.  (R., vol. II, p. 351.)  The first mention of 
having run out of telephone funds was at the August 21, 2015 pre-trial 
conference.  (8/21/15 Tr., p. 37, L. 25 – p. 38, L. 5.)2  Eiland failed to establish 
that lack of telephone funds was the reason he had failed to retain Dr. Reisberg. 
Moreover, the state established that it would be prejudiced by a 
continuance given the prior continuances and the efforts and expense it had 
made to secure the attendance of several witnesses, including from out-of-state.  
(9/11/15 Tr., p. 4, L. 5 – p. 5, L. 10.)   
The record establishes that Eiland had both the funding and sufficient time 
(three months) to retain and prepare Dr. Reisberg to testify at trial.  Despite that, 
his total attempts to have Dr. Reisberg retained and prepared for trial amount to 
one phone call and an unknown number of emails by standby counsel, all at 
unknown times.  Moreover, the excuse that more was not done because of lack 
of money for long-distance calls is belied by the fact that Eiland made only one 
call to Dr. Reisberg in the more than two months before his telephone funds 
allegedly ran out, and the fact that Eiland made no written motion for more 
telephone funds.  In addition, the prosecution established that the state would be 
prejudiced both generally and specifically if the trial were continued yet again.  
                                            
2 It is worth noting that in response to Eiland’s claim the prosecutor offered to 
work with Eiland and standby counsel to make sure Eiland could communicate 
with his experts.  (8/21/15 Tr., p. 39, Ls. 4-12.)  Ultimately it was the state that 
filed a written motion requesting additional telephone funds for Eiland, albeit after 




Under these circumstances, Eiland has failed to establish any abuse of 
discretion. 
 In this case Eiland had plenty of time and opportunity to have Dr. Reisberg 
retained and ready for trial.  Moreover, he failed to show what Dr. Reisberg would 
have testified to, much less that his testimony was necessary for a fair trial.  
Finally, even if there were prejudice from not having Dr. Reisberg ready for trial, 
such prejudice must be laid at the feet of Eiland himself.  It was not the district 
court that prevented Dr. Reisberg from testifying, it was Eiland’s lack of diligence.  
Eiland has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by not 




 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Eiland’s judgment. 
 DATED this 18th day of October, 2016. 
 
      _/S/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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